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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Jurisdiction over this case is vested in the Utah Supreme
Court pursuant to the provisions of Article VIII Section 4 of the
Utah State Constitution, U.C.A. Section 78-2-2 (1953 as amended),
and Rule 3 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting

Defendants' motion for summary judgment when it did not construe
the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff and erroneously
found that no genuine issue of material fact existed.
2.

Whether genuine issues of material fact existed as to

whether Plaintiff was aware of facts that would have led her to
conclude there was a reasonable possibility that her injury was
caused by Defendants' negligence.

2

STATEMENT OF CASE

Plaintiff filed this action in the Second Judicial District
Court, Weber County, alleging medical malpractice.

(R. 1, 81).

Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint, (R. 21), but
the

trial

answered

court denied
Plaintiff's

Defendants' motion.

complaint.

Defendants then

(R. 110).

Plaintiff

then

motioned for a separate trial on the issue of the statute of
limitations.
judgment.

(R.

126).

then moved

for summary

(R. 168). The facts presented to the trial court were

disputed, but adopting
found

Defendants

that

no

genuine

Defendants' version thereof, the court
issue

of material

fact existed, and

consequently granted Defendants' motion. (R. 280).

Plaintiff's

moved to alter or amend the judgment, but the court denied the
motion.

(R. 351, 377 and 378).

3

Statement of Facts,

(1) The following statement of material facts was submitted
to

the

trial

Authorities

court

in Plaintiff's

in Opposition

Statement of

Points and

to Defendants' Motions for Summary

Judgment, dated October 18, 1989:
a.

Plaintiff

Holli

Mahoskey

(hereinafter

"Plaintiff"), has alleged that Defendants committed medical
malpractice

in

failing

to diagnose her breast cancer.

(Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, paragraph 16.)
b.

Plaintiff found a small lump in her right breast

in February of 1985.

On April 3, 1985, she was examined by

Defendant, Boyd Farr, M.D. to determine whether the lump was
malignant.

Dr. Farr attempted to aspirate the lump several

times, and being unsuccessful, requested Defendant, Chris
Christensen, M.D., to assist him in the examination.

Dr.

Christensen examined the lump and also attempted to aspirate
it without

success.

(Plaintiff's

Deposition, pages 6

through 11; Plaintiff's Affidavit, pages 1-2; Plaintiff's
Amended Complaint, paragraphs 11 and 12.)
c.

Both doctors used the same methods in examining and

attempting to aspirate the lump.

Both doctors were informed

by Plaintiff of a family history of cancer, in particular,
that Plaintiff's mother had contracted colon cancer, and
that Plaintiff had first noticed the lump two months

4

previous to the exam.

(Plaintiff's Deposition, pages 6, 7

and 33; Plaintiff's Affidavit, page 2.)
d.

During the April 3, 1985 examination, Plaintiff was

told by the Defendants that she was too young to have cancer
and, therefore, the lump could not be cancerous.
doctor

mentioned

or

discussed

any

further

Neither
tests

or

procedures

to determine whether the lump was benign or

malignant.

Defendants simply told Plaintiff to continue

regular breast exams and to come back for a check-up in
three months.

Plaintiff left the April 3, 1985 exam feeling

that she had been properly examined and that the lump was
not malignant.

(Plaintiff's Deposition pages 11 through 13;

Plaintiff's Affidavit page 2; Plaintiff's Amended Complaint,
paragraph 13.)
e.

In July of 1985, Plaintiff noticed that the lump

had begun to grow larger, and
sore.

had become sensitive and

(Plaintiff's Deposition, pages 14, 15, 43 through

46; Plaintiff's Affidavit, page 2.)
f.

On July 17, 1985, Plaintiff was examined by Dr.

James Gardner who observed that the lump had grown three
times its original size and that it was clearly cancerous.
This diagnosis was based on a biopsy performed that same
day.

On July 19, 1985, Plaintiff's right breast was removed

in a modified

radical mastectomy surgery.

(Plaintiff's

Deposition, pages 15 through 18; Plaintiff's Amended

5

Complaint, paragraphs 14 and 15; Plaintiff's Affidavit, page
2.)
g.

Plaintiff

had

contact with two other doctors

pursuant to treatment of her breast cancer.

Dr. Alton

Wagnon supervised chemotherapy treatment and folJow-up. Dr.
Conrad

Monson

performed

sterilization

surgery

on the

Plaintiff, to insure that she would not become pregnant
during

her

(Plaintiff's

six

months

of

chemotherapy

deposition, pages

18-21,

treatment.

27, 49 and 50;

Plaintiff's Affidavit, pages 2-4.)
h.
Wagnon

Although
and

Plaintiff

Dr. Monson

questioned

Dr. Gardner, Dr.

about whether Dr. Farr and Dr.

Christensen should have diagnosed the cancer at an earlier
date, each time she made such an inquiry, she was either
told that they did not know, or she was told nothing —
did not answer her inquiries.

they

Based upon such answers/non-

answers to the inquiries, PlaintLff concluded that either
the doctors could not truly determine whether Dr. Farr and
Dr. Christensen should have diagnosed the cancer, or that
they had an opinion on the matter, but did not wish to share
it with her.

(Plaintiff's Deposition, pages 16, 18, 25, 27,

37 and 38; Plaintiff's Affidavit, page 3.)
i.

Dr. Wagnon told the Plaintiff, in August of 1985,

that had the cancer been discovered earlier, it was possible
that a less drastic operation, a lumpectomy, may have been
sufficient to treat the cancer, but he could not be sure.

6

(Plaintiff's

Deposition, pages

25 and

38; Plaintiff's

Affidavit, page 3.)
j.
Plaintiff

Other than Dr. Gardner, Dr. Wagnon and Dr. Monson,
talked

to no other doctors nor to any other

medical professionals, prior to September of 1988, about
whether Dr. Farr and Dr. Christensen should have diagnosed
the cancer in April of 1985.

(Plaintiff's Deposition pages

22, 24-28 and 51; Plaintiff's Affidavit, pages 3 and 4 )
k,

Although Plaintiff felt anger toward Dr. Farr and

Dr. Christensen when she first discovered she Jiad cancer,
and

felt

some

suspicion that perhaps they

should have

diagnosed her cancer in April of 1985, she had no personal
knowledge or basis for justifying such suspicion nor for
forming an opinion about whether the doctors' examination
of her breast lump was negligent or otherwise; nor was she
able to determine by inquiring of her other doctors whether
there was any basis for thinking that perhaps Dr. Farr and
Dr. Christensen had acted negligently.
no

knowledge

Plaintiff also had

that other inexpensive tests existed

that

should have been performed to properly diagnose her cancer.
(Plaintiff's Deposition, pages 16, 18, 25, 27, 28, 35, 37,
38 and 46; Plaintiff's Affidavit, page 4.)
1.
her

Plaintiff suffered devastating side effects from

surgeries

and

chemotherapy.

Among

other things,

Plaintiff lost her hair and her immune system ceased to
function

normally.

Consequently,
7

Plaintiff

constantly

suffered from illnesses, chronic weakened physiccil condition
and

continuous mental and emotional distress until lcite

summer of 1988.
consequent

The Plaintiff's continuous poor health and

concomitant

stresses, in

addition

to

her

preoccupation with the foreseeable recurrence of the cancer,
rendered

the

investigate

Plaintiff
the

unable

possibility

to work

that

Dr.

or rationally
Farr

and

Dr.

Christensen were negligent in failing to diagnose her breast
cancer until September of 1988.

(Plaintiff's Deposition,

pages 23-24, 26-29, 34-35, and 47-53; Plaintiff's Affidavit,
page 4; Affidavit of Dr. Alton Wagnon.)
m.

Plaintiff contacted Douglas M. Durbano, Attorney at

Law, about her situation in October of 1988.

Following a

preliminary examination into the matter by her attorney, she
was told that failure of Dr. Farr and Dr. Christensen to
give her a biopsy in April of 19 85 was probably negligent
conduct,

which

could

give

her

a

cause

of

action.

(Plaintiff's Affidavit, pages 4-5.)
(2) Defendants, in their briefs and at the hearing on the
Motions for Summary Judgment, emphasized their interpretations of
statements made by Plaintiff at her deposition relating to the
anger and suspicion she felt toward the Defendants at the time
she discovered she had cancer in July of 1985.
interpreted

these

feelings

of

anger

and

The Defendants

suspicion OF the

Plaintiff, that the defendant doctors should have discovered her
cancer

at

an

earlier

date, as evidence of the Plaintiff's

8

knowledge or constructive knowledge in July of 1985 that she had
sustained an injury due to negligent action on the part of the
Defendants•
(3)

In Plaintiff's

Defendants'

Motions

brief

for

and

Summary

at

the

hearing

Judgment,

the

on

the

Plaintiff

emphasized the following facts to the Court:
a.

Although

Plaintiff

had

feelings of anger and

suspicion towards the Defendant doctors, suspecting that perhaps
they should have discovered her breast cancer in April of 1985,
she had

no

evaluate

the

Defendants.

personal

knowledge or experience

possibility

from which to

of negligence on the part of the

Moreover, Plaintiff was unable to obtain information

about the possibility of Defendants' negligence from her treating
doctors

in July

discovered

and

August

she had breast

of

1985, between the time she

cancer and the beginning

of her

radiation treatments for breast cancer.
b.
Plaintiff

Between August of
suffered

chemotherapy

side

1985 and September wf 1988,

affects

treatment, including

from

her

surgery

and

frequent bouts of illness,

continuing mental and emotional distress, and a chronic weakened
physical

condition.

concomitdut

Because

of

her

poor

health

and its

stresses, the Plaintiff was unable to rationally

explore or evaluate the possibility that the defendant doctors
were negligent in failing to diagnose her breast cancer.

It was

not until she returned to a reasonably normal physical, mental
and emotional state in the late summer of 1988 that she was able
q

to address the issue of the possibility of the defendant doctors'
negligence.
(4) The trial court usurped the role of the trier of fact
when it did not refrain from ruling on Defendants' motions for
summary

judgment even though the parties clearly presented a

genuine issue of material fact; whether (a) the facts known by
the Plaintiff and (b)

the Plaintiff's state of mind in July of

1985 showed that the Plaintiff knew or should have discovered
through the use of reasonable diligence that she had sustained an
injury and that the injury was caused by Defendants' negligent
actions.

Furthermore, the trial court did not view the facts in

a light most favorable to the Plaintiff as required by Utah law.
The Court ignored the facts as stated by the Plaintiff, and
adopted the facts as proposed by the Defendants, in granting
Defendants' Motions

for

Summary Judgment and

in dismissing

Plaintiffs' Complaint.
(5) On January 16, 1990, the trial court signed the Order
of Summary Judgment and entered that Order in this action on
January 17, 1990. Thereafter, on January 23, 1990, the Plaintiff
filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Summary Judgment under U.R.C.P.
Rule 59.

Memorandums of Points and Authorities were submitted

by all parties on that Motion, and on March 16, 1990, the trial
court signed and entered its Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion to
Alter or Amend Summary Judgment.

10

In its Order of Motion for

Summary Judgment dated January ^

1990, the trial court ruled

that "the Plaintiff had knowledge of the existence of an injury,
its cause and the possibility of negligence in July, 1985...."

11

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In granting

Defendants' Motion

for Summary Judgment, the

trial court was faced with the issue of whether Plaintiff knew or
should have known she suffered a legal injury because of medical
malpractice.

The trial court held that Plaintiff had knowledge of

the existence of an injury, its cause and the possibility of
negligence in July of 1985.
The trial court abused its discretion in determining its
holding because, as required by Utah law, it did not construe the
facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.

The trial court

also abused its discretion because the case was not so clear as to
find that no genuine issues of material fact existed as a matter
of law.

Instead, the facts, according to Plaintiff, indicate that

at no time before August of 1988 did Plaintiff have sufficient
facts for the trial court to determine that she knew or should
have known of the possibility of medical negligence.

Lastly, the

trial court abused its discretion by granting Defendants' Motion
for

Summary

Judgment

because

it disregarded

presumption created by U.C.A. 78-12-47.

the

equitable

Thus, the trial court's

decision granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should
be reversed.

12

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT BY FAILING TO CONSTRUE THE FACTS
IN A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO PLAINTIFF AND
ERRONEOUSLY FINDING THAT NO GENUINE ISSUE
OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTED.
The standard of review that an Appellate Court must apply
when reviewing an appeal from a summary judgment is whether the
trial court abused
motion.
The

its discretion in granting or denying the

Wheeler v. Mann, 763 P.2d 758, 759 (Utah 1988).
trial

court, when

faced with a motion

for summary

judgment, must follow the relevant Utah civil procedure rule.
Rule 56(c) of U.R.C.P. provides that the "judgment sought shall be
rendered

forthwith

if the pleadings, depositions

. . . and

[affidavits] . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law."

Thus, according to the rule, if there is any

genuine issue of material fact, the court, as a matter of law,
cannot grant a summary judgment motion.
The court's role in determining whether a motion for summary
judgment should be granted has been further defined and documented
in recent Utah case law.

According to the Utah Supreme Court, in

Barlow Society v. Commercial Security Bank, 723 P.2d 398 (Utah
1986); Durnham v. Marqetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977)J Brower v.

13

Brown, 744 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1987), the following guidelines are to
be strictly adhered to:
a

light most

(1) the Court must construe the facts in

favorable to the non-moving

party,

(2) summary

judgment should only be granted when the matter is clear and there
is no room for doubt, and (3) if there is a statute governing the
exercise of summary judgment in a particular context, the statue
should be followed.

These points may now be treated in their

respective order.
A.

In Reviewing a Summary Judgment, the
Court Must Construe the Facts in a
Light Most Favorable to the NonMoving Party.

The court's obligation to construe the facts in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party is well settled and undisputed.
In Barlow Society v. Commercial Security Bank, 723 P.2d 398, (Utah
1986), the Utah Supreme Court explicitly declared and outlined the
guideline:
"In reviewing a summary judgment, this Court
will view the facts in a light most favorable
to the party opposing the motion and will
allow the summary judgment to stand only if
the movant is entitled to summary judgment as
a matter of law on the undisputed facts."
Id. at 1399. See also Wheeler v. Mann, 763 P.2d at 759.
This guideline is particularly
case.

applicable to the instant

In granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment, the

district court clearly did not construe the facts in the light
14

most favorable to Plaintiff.

Indeed, it may be confidently stated

that the district court did not construe the facts as presented by
Plaintiff in any way, but instead, summarily rejected them.
the

court construed

Plaintiff, it would

the facts in a light most

Had

favorable to

have found that there was a genuine and

material, factual dispute as to whether Holli Mahoskey knew or
should have known, in July of 1985, that the injury which she had
suffered was caused by Dr. Farr's and Dr. Christensen's negligent
diagnosis.

This disputed issue alone would have been enough to

demonstrate that Defendants did not meet their burden of proof on
their motion for summary

judgment.

Thus, the district court

abused its discretion in granting Defendants' motion for summary
judgment.
B.

Summary Judgment Should be Granted
Only When the Matter is Clear and
There is No Room for Doubt.

The Utah Supreme Court set out general parameters further
explaining when a motion for summary judgment should and should
not be granted in Durnham v. Marqetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977).
In that case the Court asserted:
"Summary judgment . . . should not be done on
conjecture, but only when the matter is clear;
and in the case of doubt, the doubt should be
resolved in allowing the challenged party the
opportunity of at least attempting to prove
his right to recover . . .[U]nless the court
is able to conclude that there is no dispute
on material facts . . . the court should not
15

summarily . . . render judgment . . . as a
matter of law."
Id. at 1338.

(Emphasis added).

Relevant to the preceding guideline, the Utah Supreme Court
in the recent case of Chapman v. Primary Children's Hospital, 784
P.2d 1181 (Utah 1989), stated that "close calls" on factual issues
"are for juries, not judges, to make."

Id. at 1186.

Thus,

summary judgment is not appropriate unless the parties' affidavits
and other instruments make it clear that no genuine issue remains
as to matters of material fact.
These guidelines are also specifically significant to the
present case.

It is not clear whether Holli Mahoskey should have

or even could have known that her injury was caused by her
doctors' negligence.

What is clear is that there is a genuine

issue of material fact when those facts are construed in a light
most favorable to Plaintiff.

Even if the existence of a material

factual issue was a "close call," the district court should have
given Plaintiff

the opportunity to have her day in court and

attempt to prove her right to recover.

Whether she should have,

or even could have known that her injury was caused by another
party's negligence is an issue for the jury.
court

abused

its

discretion

in not

allowing

opportunity to prove her right to recover.
16

Thus, the district
Plaintiff

the

C.

The

Utah

Because of the Bifurcated Trial
Statute, U.C.A. section 78-12-47,
the Utah Supreme Court Disfavors
Granting Defendants' Motions for
Summary Judgment in Medical
Malpractice Cases, Where the Issue
is the Running of the Statute of
Limitations.
legislature

has

codified

the procedure to be

followed when the issue of the running of a statute of limitations
arises in a medical malpractice context.

Section 78-12-47 of the

Utah Code Annotated provides that if, in malpractice actions, "the
defendant pleads that the action is barred by the statute of
limitations, the issue raised thereby may be tried separately and
before any other issues in the case are tried."
In Brower v. Brown, 744 P. 2d 1337 (Utah 1987), the Utah
Supreme Court explained the presumption the statute creates and
its effect on summary judgment motions where the running of the
statute of limitations was at issue.

Concerning the statute, the

Court stated:
"This provision meets the same policy concerns
as a grant of summary judgment based on the
expiration of a statutory limitation period.
Like summary judgment, it eliminates the need
for defendants to litigate stale claims on
substantive grounds when the trier of fact
ultimately finds that the statute has run;
however, unlike summary judgment, it does not
bar the trier of fact from making a factual
determination as to the running of the
statute. Thus, the interests of both parties
17

are balanced better by the statutory provision
than by the grant of summary judgment."
Id. at 1337.

Because the Court was concerned with balancing the

interests of opposing parties, it emphasized the importance of
factual determinations to be made by triers of fact in medical
malpractice actions.

The Court re-emphasized this point when it

later declared that the statutory provision "supportTedl the view
that

the

determination

of when

the

plaintiff

should

have

discovered the legal injury fwasl a question for the trier of
fact. "

Id.

at

1339.

Thus, the Court properly

focused on

balancing and fairly serving the just interests of both parties.
Serving

the

interests

of both parties, providing

equity and

fairness as justice requires, is of paramount importance to any
court.

Equity and justice are at issue in the case at hand.

According to the cited statute and its application as explained by
the Utah Supreme Court, both Plaintiff's and Defendants' interests
would be balanced better if Holli Mahoskey was lawfully granted
her right to her day in court.
In summary, the trial court erred when it granted Defendants'
motion for summary judgment because: (1) it did not construe the
facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, (2) the
issue on which summary judgment was granted was not clear, and (3)
the bifurcated trial statute, U.C.A. section 78-12-47, creates the
presumption that the non-moving party should have its day in court
18

when the issue is the running of the statute of limitations in
medical malpractice actions.

Therefore, the trial court erred

when it granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
POINT II
A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTED AS
TO WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS AWARE OF FACTS THAT
WOULD HAVE LED HER TO CONCLUDE THERE WAS A
REASONABLE POSSIBILITY THAT HER INJURY WAS
CAUSED BY DEFENDANTS' NEGLIGENCE.
As illustrated above, the trial court abused its discretion
when it granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants by holding
that the statute of limitations had run since Plaintiff, Holli
Mahoskey, knew or should have known that the injury she received
was a result of medical malpractice more than two years before she
filed her intent to commence an action.
P. 2d 144

(Utah

In Foil v. Ballinqer, 601

1979) , the Utah Supreme Court created a test

whereby Utah courts can determine when the statute of limitations
begins to run in medical malpractice actions.
A.

The "Foil" Legal Injury Test, Which Indicates
When the Statute of Limitation Begins to Run,
as Modified by Deschamps, Requires the
Plaintiff to Know of Facts That Would Lead Her
to Conclude There was a Reasonable Possibility
That Her Injury was Caused by the Negligence
of Defendants.

The statute governing when malpractice actions may be brought
against health care providers is found in Utah Code Ann. section
78-14-4.

The statute provides in relevant part:
19

"(1) No malpractice action against a health
care provider may be brought unless it is
commenced within two years after the*
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the
use of reasonable diligence should have
discovered the injury, whichever first
occurs, but not to exceed four years after the
date of the alleged act, omission, neglect or
occurrence . . . "
Interpreting the statute, the Utah Supreme Court in Foil held
that for policy reasons, the statutory term "injury" meant "legal
injury."

Id. at 147. It then held that the statute of limitations

would begin to run "when an injured person [knew] or should [have
known] that he had suffered a legal injury." Id.

Finally, the

Court defined "legal injury'" creating a two-pronged test, the use
of which rendered the application of the statute more equitable.
The Court stated the test as follows:

".

. . the two-year

provision does not commence to run until the injured person knew
or should have known that he had sustained an injury and that the
injury was caused by negligent action." Id. at 148.
added).

(Emphasis

This test is hereinafter referred to as the "Foil" test.

The Court explained several policy reasons justifying its
attempt to administer justice and equity in developing the Foil
test's second prong:

(1) to compensate for the great disparity in

medical knowledge between doctors and patients, (2) to prevent
punishing the untutored, average layperson for his inability to
recognize

apparent

connections between treatment
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provided and

injury suffered, (3) to avoid the filing of unfounded claims for
the sole purpose of preventing the statue of limitations from
running, and (4) to prevent health providers from making attempts
to suppress knowledge of medical mistakes.
148.

See

Foil, at 147,

See also Deschamps v. Pulley, 784 P.2d 471, 473 (Utah App.

1989).
The most recent case dealing with the issue of the statute of
limitations in medical malpractice actions is Deschamps v. Pulley.
There, a daughter brought an medical malpractice action against a
doctor for negligent medical treatment given to her mother which
subsequently caused her mother's death.

However, the Utah Supreme

Court held that since the plaintiff knew of the legal injury more
than two years before she filed the action, her claim was barred
by the statute of limitations.

The Court also cited, in addition

to the Foil test, a more specific and refined test developed by
the United States District Court, D. Utah. Central Division, in
Hargett v. Limberg, 598 F. Supp. 152 (1984).

The refinement was

developed to resolve a confusion which had plagued the Foil test
since its inception.

That confusion involved the distinction

between "legal injury" and "legal conclusion of negligence."

The

United States District Court stated that a legal determination of
negligence was not necessary to start the statute of limitations;
"Rather, the crucial question [was] whether
the plaintiff was aware of the facts that
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would lead a reasonable person to conclude
that they may have a cause of action against
the health provider. Those facts include the*
existence of an injury, its cause and the
possibility of negligence."
Harqett, at 155.

This test shall hereinafter be referred to as

the "Deschamps" test.

Among the new elements added to the Foil

test language by the Deschamps test were the terms "aware of
facts," "reasonable person" and "possibility of negligence."

The

addition of these new terms, like the addition of the second prong
of the Foil test, should also be viewed as an attempt to render
the statute's application more equitable.

An analysis of these

new terms will increase the intelligibility of both tests.
terms will be analyzed in their respective order;

The

the first term

to be treated is "awareness of facts."
The Deschamps test equates its term, "awareness of facts,"
with

the

Foil

test's

term,

"knowledge

of negligence."

In

Deschamps, the Utah Supreme Court focused on the narrow question
presented—"knowledge of negligence."

Deschamps, at 473.

Two

paragraphs later, the Court, citing Harqett stated, "the crucial
question is whether the plaintiff was aware of the facts that
would lead a reasonable person to conclude that he may have* a
cause of action against the health care provider."

Id.

(Emphasis

added). Thus, the Court equated "awareness of facts" to "knowledge
of negligence," meaning actual "knowledge of medical negligence."
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This conclusion is affirmed by the language the Court uses after
citing Hargett, wherein it continues to use the term, "knowledge
of negligence."

See Id,

that a plaintiff

Such usage emphasizes the requirement

have knowledge, not mere suspicion, of the

medical negligence which caused his or her injury for the statute
of limitations to run.
(10th

Cir.

1983)

See Vest v. Bossard, 700 F.2d 600, 604

("Mere suspicions or the possibility

of a

plaintiff having factual knowledge is not enough to cause the
statute of limitations to run in favor of the defendants.")

The

new term "reasonable person" may now be reviewed.
A

"reasonableness"

Deschamps.

requirement

is

also

emphasized

in

As stated above, the Deschamps test expressly included

the element of reasonableness by referring to what a reasonable
person would conclude from certain facts.

The Foil court also

imposed a "reasonableness" requirement by requiring the injured
person

to

exercise

"reasonable diligence" in determining

nature and cause of his or her injury.

the

See Foily 601 P.2d at 149.

To make the test rationally consistent, the characteristic of
reasonableness should also attach to and qualify the new term,
"possibility of negligence."
Depending on its interpretation, the Deschamps test's third
new term,

"possibility of negligence," renders the whole test

either internally inconsistent or objectively reasonable.
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If the

term is not qualified by reasonableness, then any possibility of
negligence

would

be sufficient

to bring a cause of action,

regardless of how remote that possibility might be.

Since the

practice of medicine is not an exact science, there is always the
remote possibility that a medical professional has been negligent
when his care seems to result in or fails to stop ci particular
injury.

Even if medical negligence merely appears to exist in a

particular case, human nature often pushes a person to blame the
medical professional for his troubles, whether placing that blame
is justified or not.
possibility

of

interpretation

Moreover, not only is there always a remote

negligence,
directly

but

contradicts

a

"remote

the Utah

possibility"
Supreme Court's

policy reasons for developing the second prong of the Foil test to
begin with.

Indeed, if a remote possibility of medical negligence

were sufficient grounds for legal action, a claimant would be
deemed to have knowledge of the possibility of negligence when he
had knowledge of the injury, and the second prong of the Foil test
would thus become meaningless and useless.
However,

if

the

term

"possibility

of

negligence"

is

interpreted to mean "reasonable possibility of negligence," then
the

internal

consistency

of

the

Foil

test, the definitive

Deschamps supplement and the integrity of the Utah Supreme Court
is preserved.

The consistency of the Foil test would be preserved
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because reasonable persons should know of reasonable possibilities
of medical negligence.
consistent

because

The Deschamps test would be internally

it would

not require reasonable, injured

laypersons to be aware of and responsible for "unreasonable" or
"remote" possibilities of medical negligence.

The integrity of

the Utah Supreme Court would be preserved because, by adopting the
"reasonable possibility" clause, the second prong of the Foil test
would

still

be

rational, equitable

and viable.

Thus, the

possibilities of medical negligence for which plaintiffs should be
accountable

and

those which

limitations

to run should

would

trigger

the

statute of

be

"reasonable" possibilities, not

to

the

"remote" ones.
In

summary, pursuant

Foil

test as modified by

Deschamps, where the issue concerns Utah Code Ann. section 78-14-4
and the commencing of its statutory two year limitations period,
justice and equity require the following:

The two year statute of

limitations period should not commence to run until the injured
person (1) knows or should know that she has sustained an injury,
and

(2) knows, or with the exercise of reasonable diligence,

should know of the existence of a reasonable possibility of
medical negligence.
B.

Application of the Foil/Deschamps
Standard to the Instant Case.

Application of the Foil/Deschamps standard to the instant
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case demonstrates that the statute of limitations had not run when
Plaintiff, Hollie Mahoskey, brought her claim against Defendants.
The first prong of the test is not in dispute.

In late July of

1985, Holli knew or should have known she had suffered a physical
injury.

On July 19, 1985, Holli's right breast was completely

removed because the lump previously diagnosed by Defendants was
"clearly cancerous."
Dr.

Wagnon

told

(R 9, 84, 129). Later, in August of 1985,

Holli

that

if

her

cancer

could

have been

discovered earlier, it could possibly have been treated with less
drastic treatment.

(R. 159). Thus, only the second prong of the

test is in dispute here.
Plaintiff did not know nor did she have reason to know of the
existence of a reasonable possibility of medical negligence, even
though she exercised reasonable diligence in trying to determine
if she had been a victim of it.

In fact, Plaintiff's situation is

the type which the Utah Supreme Court tried to prot€>ct when it
decided the Foil v. Ballinqer case.
"In the health care field it is typically the
case that there often is a great disparity in
the knowledge of those who provide health care
services and those who receive the services
with respect to expected and unexpected side
effects of a given procedure, as well as the
nature, degree and extent of expected aft€>r
effects. While the recipient may be aware of
a disability or dysfunction, there may be, to
the untutored understanding of the average
layman, no apparent connection between the
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treatment provided by a physician
injury suffered."
Foil at 147.

and the

A closer review of the facts will illustrate the

applicability of the Court's language.
As stated in the facts, on April 3, 1985, Holli was examined
and treated by not one, but two doctors.

(R. 1, 147-150).

Independently, each doctor employed the same examination method
and each doctor reached the same conclusion:
breast was not and could not be cancerous.
medical

background

and

no

reason

the lump in Holli's
(R. 151). She had no

to question or doubt the

information she received from the two doctors or the procedures
they performed.

Indeed, she deeply trusted Defendant Dr. Farr

because he had been her physician for a number of years and he had
always given her good care.

(R. 147, 161).

She believed him.

She also followed his instruction and continued to monitor the
lump in her breast for signs of cancer.

Nor was she aware of

the further procedures routinely performed in these circumstances
to verify the diagnosis, which were not performed in her behalf.
In July of 1985, Holli noticed that the lump was larger and
very sensitive and sore.

(R. 197). On July 17, 1985, Holli was

examined by Dr. James Gardner who, after performing a biopsy,
informed Holli that the lump was clearly cancerous.

(R 197).

Two

days later, Holli underwent modified radical mastectomy surgery
and her right breast was completely removed.
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(R 197). After the

surgery, Holli had frequent contact with two other doctors;
Wagnon, who

supervised

her

chemotherapy

performed Holli's sterilization therapy.

Dr.

and Dr. Monson who

(R 197).

As the uncontested facts indicate, Holli questioned these
doctors regarding the care she received from Defendants Farr and
Christensen, desiring to know if cancer could have and should have
been detected earlier.

Yet each time she inquired, she was either

told that they did not know, or she was told nothing at all.
197).

(R

As was stated above, Dr. Wagnon told Holli that if the

cancer could have been discovered earlier, less drastic measures
may have been sufficient for treating the cancer, but he was not
sure.

(R 198). This response did not answer Holli's question of

whether tjie cancer could have been discovered earlier, but only
informed her of a well known general medical principle.', i.e., the
earlier that a disease is discovered, the less drastic will be the
measures necessary to solve the problem.

What Holli needed was

information or facts from which she could conclude there was a
reasonable

possibility

of medical negligence

Defendants Farr and Christensen.

on the part of

Neither Dr. Wagnon's recitation

nor the responses from her other doctors revealed to Holli any
such facts or information.

Thus, even after Holli discovered she

had breast cancer, she still was not aware of facts which gave her
knowledge or should have given her knowledge of a reasonable
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possibility that Dr. Farr and Dr. Christensen had been negligent
in failing to diagnose such cancer in April of 1985.
Comparing the instant case to the Deschamps case reveals
significant factual variations.

It may be recalled that in the

Deschamps case, a daughter brought an action for the negligent
medical treatment of her mother, Mrs. Schulz.

Mrs. Schulz died

because a regimen of drugs prescribed by her doctor, caused her to
contract the fatal disease vasculitis.

Ms. Deschamps retained an

attorney to investigate the situation even before Mrs. Schulz'
death.

The Utah

Supreme Court affirmed

a summary judgment,

holding that Ms. Deschamps knew or should have known of the legal
injury which was the basis of her action more than two years
before we filed her action.

Deschamps, 784 P.2d at 473.

The Court found that in October of 1984, at the time of her
mother's death, Ms. Deschamps was aware of or should have been
aware of the facts and information regarding her mother's disease
and subsequent death.

By reviewing and comparing Mrs. Schulz'

medical records with the medical literature on vasculitis over a
two month

period, Ms. Deschamps' attorney acquired

Deschamps,

information

which was

for Ms.

sufficient to commence the

running of the statute of limitations period under U.C.A. 78-14-4.
Id.
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In the instant case, as stated above, Holli Mahoskey had no
facts in her possession, other than her personal knowledge as a
layperson, from which to form a conclusion about the possibility
of negligence on the part of her doctors, until August of 1988.
At that time, for the first time, she* had an opportunity to
conduct an inquiry into the possibility of negligence.

Only then

did she obtain information and facts sufficient to commence the
running of the statute of limitations.
Moreover, Holli's situation varies from the Peschamps case
because the alleged negligence arose from a failure to diagnose,
rather than from negligent administration of treatment,

A causal

connection between negligent medical care and physical injury is
certainly

more

obvious

where

treatment

has been positively

rendered and is followed by an adverse medical condition which did
not exist until after the treatment was given.
negligent

diagnosis, the causal

In the* case of a

connection between negligent

medical care and physical injury may never be recognized.

The

Wyoming Supreme Court stated this principle in Metzger v. Kalke,
709 P.2d 414 (Wyo. 1985).
"In cases involving an undiagnosed affliction
especially, the patient may not discover the
wrong until so informed by another doctor:
The question of malpractice in a diagnostic
situation is often dependent upon when the
plaintiff is informed by another physician
that the original diagnosis was wrong and
whether if a correct diagnosis had been made
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and treatment rendered the ultimate result
would have changed. Moreover, the fact that
plaintiff obtains a correct diagnosis does not
necessarily constitute notice that the earlier
incorrect
diagnosis
was
rendered
negligently." (Citations omitted.)
Id. at 419.

Although

Metzger may not be factually identical to

the instant case, the principle it contains is valid beyond the
case's restricted
layperson

facts. It was not reasonable to require a

such as Holli to make a causal

connection between

Defendants' failure to diagnose her cancer and any possible injury
she may have suffered as a result, without first obtaining further
information from some educated source.
Shortly after her surgery, in August of 1985,
the

gruelling

journey through

chemotherapy.

Holli began

(R 154).

suffered severe and continuous side effects as a result.

She

She was

plagued by physical illnesses since her immune system was severely
weakened by the treatment.
physically

In addition, even after she recovered

from the cancer and

its treatment, Holli suffered

emotional and mental disturbances and distress.

Because of the

physical, emotional and mental distress brought on by her cancer
and subsequent treatment, Holli was unable to function normally
for almost three years, until approximately August of 1988.

At

this time, she was able to put her life back together, return to
work, investigate the possibility of plastic surgery, and further
investigate

the

possibility

of
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negligence

on

the

part

of

Defendants.

In light of the extreme physical, emotional and

mental difficulties Holli suffered as a result of her cancer and
its subsequent treatment, it was reasonable diligence on her part
to

postpone

further

investigation

of

Defendants' negligence until August of

the

1988.

possibility

of

Therefore, the

statute of limitations did not commence until September of 1988,
when Holli discovered through reasonable diligence that there was
a possibility of the Defendants' negligence.
After such a prolonged and incapacitating experience, Holli
felt

anger

toward

understandably so.

Defendants

to whether

and

Christensen,

and

After all, they had told her that the lump

could not be cancerous.
as

Farr

they

Understandably, she felt some suspicion

had

been

negligent

in

her regard.

A

layperson's suspicion and anger are not the equivalent of an
awareness

of

facts

constituting

possibility of medical negligence.
(Mere

suspicions

factual

knowledge

medical

not

enough

of

the

See Vest v. Bossard at 604.

or the possibility
is

knowledge

to

of a

[p]laintiff

cause

limitations to run in favor of the defendants).

the

having

statute

of

As her feelings

of anger and suspicion indicate, Holli, like most humans, desired
to

blame

someone

for

her

situation, whether the blame was

justifiably placed or not.

But in order for the statute of

limitations to commence in a medical malpractice action, the law
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requires more than mere unfounded suspicion and anger.

The law

requires

medical

knowledge

negligence.

of

a reasonable

possibility

of

If the Court finds that Holli's suspicions were

sufficient to commence the running of the statute of limitations,
then there can be

no legal difference between what a frustrated

layperson thinks and what an educated medical expert knows. Thus,
the

statute

of

limitations

could

not

have

commenced until

September of 1988 when Holli, having recovered from her traumatic
experience, consulted with an attorney for the first time and
obtained a reasonable knowledge of the possibility of a negligent
diagnosis.
To preserve the public policy rationale first developed by
the Utah Supreme Court in Foil, the Court must find that the
statute of limitations has not run.

A contrary decision would

discredit the Court's well reasoned and consistently heeded Foil
opinion.

CONCLUSION
The trial court abused its discretion and consequently erred
in granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

The court

did not construe the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff,
the non-moving party, nor was the case so clear that the court
could determine that no genuine issues of material fact existed.
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Further, the court disregarded the presumption created by U.C.A.
section 78-12-47 which disfavors summary judgments on the issue of
the running of the statute of limitations in medical malpractice
actions.
judgment

Moreover, the trial court erred in granting summary
and

Plaintiff,

as

consequently
an

untutored

barring

Plaintiff's

action because

layperson, did not know, nor by

exercising reasonable diligence could she have known that she was
the victim of medical malpractice.

Therefore, the trial court's

decision granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment should
be reversed and Plaintiff given her right to have her day in court
as justice and equity so require.
Respectfully submitted this

uly, 1990.

DOUGLAS\M. DUKBAfiO
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Attorneys for Plaintiff/
Appellant
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